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Abstract This paper introduces a novel approach or architecture for fraud-resistant 
and privacy-friendly Electronic Traffic Pricing (ETP). One salient contribution is that 
it can satisfy the seemingly incompatible requirements of a privacy-friendly and so- 
called “thin” solution.
The proposed approach relies on regularly sending to the traffic Pricing Authority 
(PA) only hashes of travelled trajectories and hashes of the corresponding fees due.
This makes it possible to achieve that users keep almost all data on the trajectories 
they travel and on the amounts they should pay completely hidden from the PA, with­
out having to rely for their privacy protection on a so-called Trusted Third Party 
(TTP). Only a very small percentage of all these privacy-sensitive data requires that 
the pre-image trajectories and pre-image fees are revealed to the PA for spot-checking 
purposes (to detect cheating).
The calculations of the amounts due for trajectories travelled can be done—at desire— 
inside or outside the vehicle. Thus, seamless integration of “thin” and “thick” in one 
ETP system with one and the same spot-checking approach is made possible and 
easy. The calculations can be performed in a privacy-friendly way, since they do not 
require any vehicle or On-Board Equipment (OBE) identification.
The proposal can, for example, be used as a declaration-based approach much in line 
with current tax declaration traditions in which the individual citizen is personally 
responsible. However, the proposal allows for much individual variation (including 
delegation) and many additional (commercial) services. For example, it is also possi­
ble to reduce user responsibility and/or user involvement to an absolute minimum.
1 Introduction
A fter years o f discussion the D utch governm ent has decided to introduce distance-related 
Electronic Traffic Pricing (ETP) for all vehicles on all roads by means o f m odern satellite 
technology, such as GPS or Galileo. Particularly the inclusion of personal vehicles, requir­
ing an appropriate level o f privacy protection, and the choice for tim e, location and vehicle 
category dependent kilom etre tariffs m ake this approach ambitious and new  in the world 
(see also [3]). For each individual vehicle detailed tim e and location inform ation m ust 
be collected and processed w ithout endangering privacy. The correct am ounts due can be 
calculated with the help o f a digital tariff and/or road map. Now and then— for example, 
once per three m onths— the total am ount due for the period (the “fee”) in question m ust 
be revealed to the Pricing A uthority (PA) and then collected. Clearly, the shorter these fee 
reporting periods, the greater the im pact on privacy.
In the Netherlands, this new ETP should replace— in about five years tim e— the current 
(flat) road tax and the existing special purchase tax for personal vehicles and m otorcycles. 
The m ain aims o f introducing ETP are:
-  fairness: the fee one has to pay will depend on one’s actual vehicle use;
-  congestion reduction: traffic supply can be influenced via flexible pricing policies;
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-  environm ental im pact reduction: kilom etre tariffs will partly depend on (environmen­
tal) vehicle characteristics.
The techniques for such a form  of ETP, like GPS and GSM , are all available. The chal­
lenge is to integrate them  in such a way that the system will be reliable, privacy-friendly, 
cost-effective, transparent and easy to use, and will allow easy enforcem ent and dispute 
resolution. It may be expected that some o f the intended users o f the system— drivers / 
holders /  owners o f vehicles that are registered in the N etherlands— are hostile users and 
m ay try to obstruct or abuse the system. A t the same time, the system should be trusted, by 
the various stakeholders involved.
This paper is not about general requirem ents for ETP, but focuses on privacy and secu­
rity aspects. So far this topic has received relatively little attention in the com puter security 
community. O ur aim  is to design a  system that is both secure and privacy-friendly, in which 
privacy is not treated as a post hoc  add-on, but as an essential property that needs to be built 
deeply into the architecture o f the system. We adopt M itch K apor’s slogan “architecture is 
politics” (see e.g. also [6]) and wish to design ICT-systems in such a m anner that individual 
autonom y and control over one’s own user data is offered and can be ensured, contributing 
to public trust in the system. After all, centralised inform ational control supports centralised 
societal control. This is a highly relevant issue, also in ETP.
This paper presents only the m ain lines o f a novel solution and is organised as follows. 
Sections 2  and 3 give an inform al introduction to the issues in this area via two possi­
ble solutions, as opposite extremes. Sections 4 and 6 describe the m ain ideas o f the pro­
posed solution and protocol essentials. Section 5 discusses cryptographic techniques used. 
Sections 7 and 8 discuss som e advantages and possible use scenarios. Finally, Section 9 
discusses the proposed solution from  a broader perspective.
The m ain idea o f this article is due to the first author (W dJ), see also [4]. The current 
elaboration and presentation is the result o f jo in t work.
2 Context
For ETP, vehicles will contain so-called On-Board Equipm ent (OBE). W hat this OBE 
should do precisely depends on the architecture chosen, but we assum e that it can at least:
-  determ ine its own location, e.g. via a G lobal N avigation Satellite System (GNSS), such 
as GPS or (in the future) Galileo;
-  com m unicate with the outside world, e.g. v ia GSM  or W iFi on specific locations;
-  store inform ation locally and perform  elem entary computations.
One m ust take into account m any aspects, o f which we m ention only a few here. First, 
no physical protection m easure can prevent a  user from  sending false signals to the GNSS 
receiver in a vehicle or from  blocking the true signals originating from  the navigation satel­
lites. Second, the OBE should not only do the right things, but also be prevented from  
doing any wrong things, like surreptitiously leaking location data, e.g. via a hidden/covert 
channel. Third, frequent data transm ission from  the vehicle m ay endanger privacy.
A lthough the OBE m ust satisfy certain m inim al requirem ents, it can vary m uch in type 
and in additional functionality offered (see Sections 7.1 and 8). We call the OBE:
-  “fat” or “thick” when it perform s itself the calculation o f the fees due1 for registered 
road use;
1 Actually, it might be better to use the more general term ‘usage’ instead of the more specific ‘fee 
due’, since usage can also be expressed in other ways, for instance as readings of one or more 
counters that each represent the cumulative number of kilometres travelled in a certain category. 
For example, one might use three categories: 1) ‘outside rush hours’ or ‘low price’, 2) ‘during 
rush hour in a moderately congested area’ or ‘normal price’, and 3) ‘during rush hour in a highly 
congested area’ or ‘high price’. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we will focus on the 
case of fee calculation and not explicitly treat the very similar case of usage calculation.
-  “thin” if  this calculation is perform ed outside the vehicle (by another device or organi­
sation).
Thin OBE m ust be trusted by the parties involved to register correctly. Fat OBE m ust addi­
tionally calculate correctly. Both are sensitive operations.
In our m odel we also assume that there is a (traffic) Pricing A uthority (PA) that collects 
relevant inform ation in its back office and takes care o f the collection o f fees. This PA may 
be subdivided, but is, for our purposes, best regarded as a single unit. We assum e that the 
(national, road tax) authorities are responsible for the PA.
We also assum e that there will be an open standard for the representation o f “Traffic 
data Parts” or “Trajectory Parts” (TP). In this text a TP is an elem entary data structure 
w ith location data aggregated to a path o f a certain duration (in our examples: 1 m inute), 
com prising a num ber of positions (e.g. 61; one per second, including an endpoint) together 
with a tim e stamp m arking the tim e o f the first position.
Road use fees w ill be calculated on the basis o f the relevant TPs. The process to collect 
paym ents and the precise (internal) organisation o f TPs are not relevant for this paper.
3 Two extremes
In order to further set the scene we shall sketch in this section two possible architectures for 
ETP. We shall call them  “centralised” and “decentralised” . This aspect o f (de)centralisation 
refers to the place where the actual location data o f vehicles will be stored: in the back 
office o f the PA or in individual vehicles. In general, central storage implies that individuals 
loose control over their location data. For example, at a  certain m om ent these data could be 
m ade available for marketing and surveillance/datam ining (e.g. for crim inal investigations). 
Hence, in the end the choice between central or decentralised storage is a political one, 
involving societal issues o f power and control. H ere we focus on the technical aspects.
In the centralised architecture the OBE is thin and all intelligence resides with the PA. 
The OBE frequently sends, say at least once every day, its collected location data to the PA. 
A t the end o f each period, say each quarter year, the PA calculates the total fee due.
This architecture is simple, but also rather naive. It w ill be unacceptable to m any that 
the PA gets detailed travel inform ation about every vehicle and that the central database 
with location data is vulnerable. This database will be an attractive target for individu­
als or organisations with unfriendly intentions, like terrorists or blackm ailers. The system 
administrators who control this database m ay not always behave according to the rules, 
voluntarily or unvoluntarily. In short, the m ain w eak point concerns privacy and security.
In this approach one needs to have confidence that the thin OBE registers and transfers 
all actual road use correctly. The PA m ay enforce this by “spot-checks” based on observa­
tions (e.g. photographs o f vehicles and their licence plates) m ade at random  locations and 
times. These observations can be com pared w ith the transferred registrations. A fine can be 
im posed in case o f discrepancy. N otice that these spot-checks can in principle take place 
w ithout drivers or vehicle equipm ent noticing. This has advantages, because it prevents 
drivers/vehicles from  notifying and warning each other about where to expect spot-checks.
In the decentralised architecture that we sketch next, we assum e that the OBE is fat and 
thus contains enough intelligence to calculate the fee itself. The m ain problem s with this 
architecture have to do with the OBE and its complexity. For example:
-  The OBE m ust contain the tariff and/or road m ap data to perform  the calculations. 
Since these crucial data change over time, there m ust also be a way to update them 
both securely and timely. The com bination o f security and tim eliness here is a critical 
factor involving serious problem s.
-  The OBE m ust now also be trusted to m ake the right calculations. H ence it requires 
m ore security m easures. For example, the OBE uses a separate com m unication channel 
for enforcem ent o f correct road use registration and fee calculation, see below.
-  The OBE, and particularly its software, becomes complex. This makes the OBE fragile 
and requires an option to securely update its firmware.
Clearly, the OBE will be m ore costly due to extra hardware and software required for the 
additional functionality and for the additional security measures.
In the decentralised approach the road-side checks involve interrogation o f OBE in or­
der to be able to check that the last few registrations and associated fee calculations have 
been perform ed correctly. For this request-response com m unication one usually uses D ed­
icated Short Range Com m unication (DSRC). D ue to the two-way communication, spot- 
checking locations can easily be noticed by vehicle equipment, and then automatically 
passed on as warnings to other vehicles. This has a substantially negative effect on spot- 
checking effectiveness and thus costs. On the positive side, possible discrepancies— such 
as between the actual (spot-checked) vehicle location and the vehicle locations registered 
in the m ost recent (requested) entries o f the OBE— m ay be observed directly on the spot, 
and m ay result in im m ediate reaction o f the authorities at the spot-checking location.
As extremes, we are thus faced w ith a sim ple centralised solution that is highly privacy- 
unfriendly and vulnerable to data abuse, and with a com plicated and fragile decentralised 
solution that offers good privacy protection, a t least potentially (if well-designed and well- 
implemented). O ur novel approach makes it possible to integrate ‘fat’ and ‘th in’ and also 
to com bine the best o f these two approaches. It can offer good privacy protection, even 
when realised with thin OBE, and it makes it possible to keep many advantages o f the thin 
approach, even when choosing for fat OBE. In particular, decentralised and ‘th in’ do not 
conflict anymore. Hence, the strong relations suggested (by others and in our text above) 
between centralised and ‘th in’ and betw een decentralised and ‘fa t’ are no longer valid.
4 Underlying ideas
The solution o f this paper depends on a num ber o f basic ideas and observations.
-  The basic traffic data registration (i.e. the TPs) can be protected against fraud by us­
ing ‘non-revealing’ com mits and rem ote spot-checking (i.e. rem ote from  the vehicle). 
Indeed, com mits can be perform ed w ithout revealing any (privacy-sensitive) data con­
tents. For example, by sending to the PA only the results o f hashing the data with a 
secure hash function. Such non-revealing com mits can also be used for com m itting to 
fees calculated. Thus, it is not necessary to reveal any privacy-sensitive data at first.
-  Based on a rem ote (e.g. road-side) observation o f a vehicle, the vehicle’s OBE (or the 
user’s PC or a party enlisted by the user; see Section 7.1) m ust later reveal the actual 
data concerning a short period around the tim e o f observation. N ote that these actual 
data (i.e. the TPs) are the pre-im ages o f the hash values that have been transferred to 
the PA earlier. In other words, cheating can be detected. All in all, the only privacy­
sensitive traffic and fee data that m ust be revealed to the PA are those involved in 
a spot-check. In fact, the privacy-sensitive data to be revealed for a vehicle can be 
lim ited to a very small percentage (e.g. <  1 % or even c  1 %) o f all fee and traffic 
data. N ote that one can still apply to the spot-checking process m any usual (or, say, 
‘m ore traditional’) privacy protection m easures in order to protect even this very small 
percentage as m uch as possible.
-  The identity o f a vehicle or o f OBE involved is not required for calculating the fee due 
for a trajectory part (TP). Hence, traffic fee calculation can be done anonymously.
-  Traffic fee calculations can be done anywhere (inside or outside the vehicle) and even 
by parties not trusted by the PA. For example, calculations can be perform ed by the 
vehicle user’s PC or by one or m ore parties enlisted by the vehicle user. That parties 
not trusted by the PA can be used for the fee calculations stems from  the fact that the 
fee is derived inform ation. If  the basic traffic data, i.e. the TPs, are protected against 
fraud, then it is easy to check later w hether calculations have been perform ed correctly.
-  Non-revealing fee com mits can be organised in such a way that the PA only needs 
“local” spot-checks to convince itself o f the correctness o f the total fee reported. Spot­
checks to verify the correctness of “subfees” calculated for individual TPs and spot­
checks to verify that subfees com m itted are also included in the total sum reported.
5 Background about hashes
A (secure) hash is a  function that turns a digital m essage o f arbitrary length into a garbled 
m essage of fixed length (usually 160 or 256 bits). This output value is called the hash 
(value) o f that m essage. O ther nam es are ‘digital fingerprint’ or ‘m essage digest’. Hashing 
is a basic operation in cryptology and com puter security and is described in any textbook 
(see e.g. [7,5]). A (secure) hash function, usually written as h, has two basic properties:
-  it is not feasible, given only an output value v =  h (m ), to find the “pre-im age” m ;
-  it is not feasible, given a m essage m , to find a different m ' w ith h (m ')  =  h (m ).
However, if  a value v is given (first) it is easy to check that it is the hash value of a (later) 
given m essage m , simply by calculating h (m ) and checking if  v =  h (m ). A hash value v =  
h (m ) is thus a bit-pattern that is closely related to its pre-im age m , but keeps (the contents 
of) m  excellently concealed. There are standard implem entations for such a function h, 
such as SHA-256. But here we shall abstract from  such concrete functions and shall simply 
w rite h for an arbitrary secure hash function.
5.1 U se o f hashes fo r com m itm ent
Hashes (i.e. results h (m ) o f hash function applications) can thus be used for early com m it­
m ent to a  piece o f inform ation w ithout revealing its contents. In our context, this can be 
explained in m ore detail as follows. Suppose the OBE o f a  vehicle sends to the PA at tim e 
t 1 the hash value v =  h (m ) o f a certain piece of inform ation m  (e.g. a  trajectory part TP or 
the subfee due for a TP) that is confidential in the sense that the OBE (or the vehicle’s user) 
does not wish to reveal it to the PA, at least not w ithout the need to do so. Furtherm ore, 
suppose that at some later tim e t 2 this OBE m ust reveal the piece o f inform ation m  (i.e. the 
pre-im age o f v) to the PA for spot-checking purposes and does so by sending to the PA 
bit-pattern x  pretending that x  is exactly the same as the bit-pattern m  com m itted earlier 
at tim e t 1. Then the PA can easily verify whether this is really true (i.e. that the PA is not 
cheated) by com puting h (x ) and checking whether indeed h (x ) =  v. Thus, when spot- 
checked by the PA (say at tim e t 2) the OBE or vehicle user cannot cheat the PA by sending 
a m essage (e.g. trajectory or fee) different from  the one com m itted earlier. In other words, 
as soon as the PA has received the hash v =  h (m ), the m essage m  (and thus its inform ation 
contents) becom es ‘frozen’ and ‘irreversible’ (more or less: unchangeable/im m utable).
5.2 O m ission o f c ry p to g rap h ic  details
Finally, we warn the reader that in our presentation m any details are omitted, including 
m any cryptographic details. For example, if  party A  m ust supply hashes of confidential 
bit-patterns to B  with a very short m axim um  length (in our context e.g. the fee due for a 
TP), then A  should first concatenate a fresh random  num ber to each original bit-pattern2 in 
order not to endanger its secrecy. The incorporation o f a random  num ber in the pre-im age 
prevents the receiver B  from  being able to construct a ‘deciphering’ table by brute force, 
that is, by com puting the hash of all possible pre-images.
2 Another detail omitted is that A has to keep the relationship between the original short bit-pattern 
and the random number, because otherwise A cannot reveal the correct pre-image later on.
6 Approach and protocol essentials
This section will elaborate some technical details in order to explain the essence o f the 
proposed approach. We shall concentrate on the m ain lines, which are actually quite simple. 
Several variations are possible, some o f which w ill also be discussed. We shall a t first 
assum e m inim al OBE as described in Section 2, which can only determ ine its own location, 
com m unicate with the traffic Pricing A uthority (PA), and store Trajectory Parts (TPs).
6.1 R o ad  use  re p o rtin g  & verification
In the approach proposed, com m it messages m ust be sent to the PA regularly. Here we 
assum e that the OBE of each vehicle (say, with identifier veh-id) daily sends a commit:
O B E — ► PA : (veh-id, day , h a s h day) (1)
where the “hash o f the day” is a two-level nested hash defined as the hash o f 24 x 60 =  1440 
concatenated hashes o f one m inute length trajectory parts, i.e.:
h a s h day =  h ( h (T p day,1) || • • • || h (T P day,1440) ) (2)
N otice that (1) is a very short m essage, typically in the order o f 40  bytes, that com pletely 
freezes a vehicle’s movements and whereabouts (i.e. parking and/or travelling) o f a  partic­
ular day (indicated by the variable day) w ithout revealing anything about the actual vehicle 
locations (the contents o f the TPs o f that day). The OBE stores all these trajectory parts 
T P day,j forming the pre-im ages o f the hash function h. It does so for all the reports it 
sends, until it can safely drop them  (see Section 6.4).
It is im portant to understand that the PA can use observations for spot-checking the 
underlying book-keeping. Suppose that the PA has legal proof that a specific vehicle has 
been at location I  between 8:42 and 8:43 AM  on February 13th (i.e. in m inute 523 o f day 
44). W ithin some reasonable period after that day the PA can dem and that both the pre­
im age (say, x ) o f the (outer hash of) h a s h 44 and T P 44,523 (say, y) m ust be sent in. After 
receiving x  and y, the PA verifies:
-  whether x  really corresponds to (i.e. is really the pre-im age of) the fingerprint h a s h 44 
earlier received as com m it (2 );
-  whether y indeed corresponds to (i.e. is really the pre-im age of) the 523rd fingerprint 
present in x— using that hashes have a fixed length;
-  whether the trajectory data in y is in correspondence with the observation, that is, 
whether location I  is covered by trajectory part y =  T P 44,523.
If  all three verifications are successful, then the book-keeping regarding the whereabouts in 
said minute, as frozen at the tim e o f commit, is in accordance with the observed reality. If 
one o f the three verifications fails, this indicates a possible fraud attempt. O f course, m ore 
investigation m ay be needed to exclude certain exceptional causes, such as an equipm ent 
failure that has been reported earlier (and in accordance with the rules). We will not digress 
on such issues further.
R easons fo r using  th e  nested , two-level hash . In the next few paragraphs we digress on 
the two-level fingerprint h a s h day as described in (2). Instead of this nested hash, one could 
simply transfer the fingerprint o f the concatenation o f all TPs o f the day in question:
h (T P day,1 || ••• H T P day,144o) (3)
However, then a spot-check based on car-location-tim e evidence would require revealing 
all TPs o f the day in question. Obviously, this would m ake privacy protection consider­
ably worse. So, our m ain reason for using nested hashes is the considerably better privacy
protection that can be achieved w ithout changing to a higher frequency of sending com m it 
messages to the PA.
A second reason is that the spot-checking as described— the spot-checking based on 
two-level hashes (2)— requires less data to be com municated. For, the pre-im age x  o f hash 
h a s h day consists o f 1440 hashes while the pre-im age would consist o f 1440 TPs in case 
o f a single-level hash (3) o f all TPs o f the day in question. Assuming hashes of 32 bytes 
(256 bits), the 1440 hashes take up 45 KByte. Assuming the 61 positions in a trajectory 
part require an average o f four bytes each, the 1440 TPs would require about 340 Kbyte.
A third reason is that one m ight use the hash of each TP to improve fraud resistance 
or to reduce the intensity o f the spot-checking required, particularly by storing these inner 
hashes h (T P day i ) given in (2) m ore or less safely into an A uthority’s Trusted Elem ent 
(ATE), inside the OBE. If  such is done, we say that the inner hashes are used for “internal 
com m its”, while the outer hash given in (2) is said to be used for “external com m it” . O f 
course, the degree o f safety offered by internal com mits depends on the quality o f the ATE’s 
physical protection and will never be 100%.
Actually, the above three reasons explain why the first-level (bottom-level or inner) 
hashes are present, but do not explain yet why also the outer hash is used in (2). For, one also 
could drop this outer hash and simply transfer the concatenation o f the hashes of all TPs 
o f the day in question. However, the concatenation o f 1440 hashes takes up 1440 times the 
num ber o f bytes o f one hash. Thus, the outer hashes are only present in order to reduce the 
size o f the com m it m essages. Indeed, this comes at the price of having to (request for and) 
transfer during each spot-check an extra pre-im age consisting o f the concatenation o f the 
(in our example: 1440) hashes. B ut spot-checks are perform ed for only a small percentage 
o f all com m it messages, so the net savings are considerable. In short, the outer hashes are 
there for efficiency reasons, that is, for reducing the com m unication costs.
6.2 F ee ca lcu la tion
The subfee due for each individual TP (trajectory part) can be calculated by publicly avail­
able software that uses a publicly available tariff and road map. This software m ay be run 
on the user’s own PC or on com puters o f m any independent Calculation Service Providers 
(CSPs), that is, organisations offering such calculations as a service. CSPs only have to run 
the calculation software and are supposed to prevent that this software— which m ay have 
been produced and distributed on behalf o f the PA— leaks in some way any inform ation 
to the PA or to others in the outside world. CSPs do not have to be trusted by the PA. O f 
course this software m ay also be run inside fat OBE.
The crucial point regarding privacy protection is that fee calculation need not involve 
any identity. Actually, one can organise things such that even the vehicle’s category does 
not have to be revealed to the CSP.
Sending a TP to a  CSP and then receiving back the subfee due can be done via a num ber 
o f anonym ity guaranteeing servers. (See e.g. C haum ’s mixes [1]). If  one fully trusts one 
particular CSP— one’s own PC m ay act as such— all subfee calculations can be perform ed 
by that particular CSP. However, one can also organise that for each TP the CSP to be used 
will be chosen random ly from  a set o f independent (less trusted or even non-trusted) CSPs. 
Here we assum e that ‘dossier linking’ (i.e. conspiracy) between a CSP and the PA via the 
hash o f each TP will be hindered by a little trick/variation: for com m itting a particular TP 
one sends to the PA the hash o f that TP concatenated with a random  number. A ll in all, 
privacy can be protected as long as a sufficient percentage o f the chosen CSPs do not cheat. 
M ore counterm easures exist, but are outside the scope o f this article.
6.3 F ee re p o rtin g  &  verification
In order to enable the PA to collect paym ent, for each vehicle the total traffic fee due m ust 
be reported regularly, but— for privacy reasons— not too often. Here we assume that the
OBE quarterly sends a fee report:
O B E — ► PA : (veh-id, q u a r te r, f e e quarter) (4)
The PA m ust be able to check for each vehicle that a) subfees o f individual TPs (i.e. f e e d,j) 
have been calculated correctly, and b) all these subfees add up to the reported total fee 
(i.e. feeqUarter =  J2d< N & i< 1440 f e e d,iwhere N  denotes the num ber o f days in the quar­
ter). These checks m ust be carried out in a privacy-friendly way, revealing as few subfees 
(and subtotals) as possible. A fter all, subfees (and subtotals) show a little b it about an indi­
vidual’s behaviour, for instance whether or not the vehicle has been used or not. There are 
several possible ways to organise such fee reporting and verification. For illustrative pur­
poses, we will first sketch an interactive way with a gam e-theoretic flavour. Then we will 
sketch our m ain solution using non-revealing commits via hashes. Finally, we will suggest 
possible use o f hom om orphic encryption for the hashing.
In te rac tiv e  v erification  The PA m ay com m unicate as follows with an owner o f a particular 
vehicle (or with a software agent acting on this owner’s behalf).
-  The PA says: “well, so your quarter am ount is feequarter” . Tell m e the three am ounts o f 
the months that are in this quarter. O f course, the owner should produce am ounts that 
add up to feequarter.
-  The PA then picks one particular m onth from  this quarter and proceeds to ask the 
amounts for the weeks in that m onth. Again they should add up correctly.
-  Now the PA picks one particular w eek from  the chosen m onth and asks the amounts 
for the days in that week. Again they should add up correctly.
-  The PA continues to ask the amounts o f the four quarters o f a day, picks one, asks 
for the six hour am ounts o f that quarter day, picks one hour, asks for the four quar­
ter (of an hour) amounts o f that hour, picks one quarter, and asks for the three five- 
m inute am ounts o f that quarter, and finally picks one five-minute period and asks for 
the m inute amounts of that period. O f course the questions o f the PA are organised in 
such a way that the pre-chosen day-m inute pair (day, i) is in this five-minute period.
-  Now the PA asks for T P day i and for the pre-im age o f the “hash o f the day” as described 
in (2). The PA perform s the checks from  Section 6.1 to verify that T P day,j is indeed the 
version com m itted earlier, com putes the fee due for T P dayi and checks whether this 
am ount is indeed equal to the m inute am ount reported in the previous step.
By breaking up the path to the pre-chosen day-m inute pair in many small substeps the PA 
learns relatively little about the fees o f all other trajectory parts. In this verification m ethod 
it is essential that the questions are posed and answered interactively, because otherwise 
the vehicle owner could successfully cheat and adjust am ounts outside the path chosen by 
the PA (which are not checked) so that (sub)totals still add up correctly.
N on-in terac tive  verification  via hashes Suppose that during the quarter (see also Sec­
tion 7.6) the PA also receives for each day d a “fee hash o f the day” :
fe e -h a sh d  =  h ( h ( fe e d ,1 ) || ••• H h(feed,144o)) (5)
Then checking the correctness o f an individual subfee fe e d,j is easy and very sim ilar to the 
spot-checking described in Section 6.1. In this case the PA also asks for both f e e d,j and 
the pre-im age of fe e -h a s h d. The spot-check now includes verifying whether the latter is 
indeed the pre-im age o f f e e -h a s h d, verifying whether f e e d,j is indeed the pre-im age o f the 
i-th  hash in the concatenated string o f 1440 hashes, com puting itself the fee due for T P d i 
and verifying that this am ount is indeed equal to f e e d,j.
However, this is not sufficient yet. For one could cheat by com m itting correct subfees 
and reporting a false sum as total fee. O ur solution is to change the list of all h ( fe e d,j) o f
quarter fee
month h(rm ) h (m 2) h(rn3)
week ' h(w i) h(w  2) h(w  3) h(w 4) '
day ' ' . ' '
minute • • • • • • • • • h(fee^,i) • • • • • • • • •
F igurel. Tree representation of hashes of subtotals of subfees, in which for instance the quarterly fee 
is the sum m 1 +  m 2 +  m 3 of the month amounts, and the (second) month amount m 2 is the sum 
w 1 +  w2 +  w3 +  w4 of the week amounts, etc.
a quarter into an “enriched” list representing (in post-order tree walk) the tree o f hashes 
given in F igure 1, w hich ‘freezes’ all calculation steps involved. N ote that a) the interactive 
verification that we described above, im plicitly also involves a tree structure, and b) our 
‘freezing’ allows the interactivity to be removed. Now the PA can spot-check the sum m a­
tion by selecting and checking a num ber o f “triangles” consisting o f an internal node and 
its children. Hereto one m ust reveal to the PA the pre-im ages of the hashes in these triangles 
o f the form:
h (&1 +  • • • +  a n )
h(«1) h (a 2 ) ••• h (a n_1) h (a„ )
A ll in all, the PA can convince itself in a privacy-friendly m anner o f the correctness o f the 
fee report. The sketched approach for com m itting (sub)fees via a tree o f hashes requires 
a certain am ount o f elem entary bookkeeping and com m unication that can be autom ated 
easily. It is not difficult to arrange that, for example, the OBE autom atically does all the 
w ork required (without user involvement, if  such is desired).
P ossible use o f hom om orph ic  h ash ing  O ur third approach to fee reporting does not need a 
tree o f hashes, but is com putationally m ore involved. We will only sketch it very rudim enta­
rily. L et G  be a suitable finite group with m odular m ultiplication and generator g G G. The 
discrete log problem  refers to the infeasibility o f calculating n  G N when gn G G  is given. 
Hence, we can use the function x  ^  gx as a  hom om orphic hash, since g x • g y =  gx+ y. The 
hom om orphism  property is often useful, for instance in counting protected votes via m ulti­
plication in e-voting, see e.g. [2]. In a sim ilar way one m ay use hom om orphic hashing in the 
current setting. Subfees fe e d,j o f trajectory parts T P d,j can be sent to the PA as g feed i . The 
PA can then m ultiply these hashed values and check that n d<N & ¿< 1440 gfeed i =  gfeequarter.
There are a num ber o f subtle points that need to be addressed, among which the follow­
ing. The am ounts f e e d,j are typically small num bers that should be “blinded” to prevent 
that fe e d,j can be obtainded from  gfeed i by trying a lim ited num ber o f values. Blinding 
can occur by m ultiplying gfeed i w ith gRd,i, where R d,j is a random  value (or actually a 
well-chosen hash value that also acts as binder) and g0 G G  is coprim e with g. U se o f g0 
(instead o f g) hinders interfering with the fee by “shifting” between the exponents in the 
product. The sum R  o f the random  values m ust be subm itted together with feequarter so that 
the PA can check the equation H d< N  & ¿<1440 gfeed,igRd,i =  gfeequartergR .
6.4 C onfirm ations
At various stages a user or his/her OBE needs to receive (digitally) signed inform ation from  
the PA. For example:
-  confirmations of receipt o f the trajectory com m it messages (2 ) and o f the fee reports 
that have been subm itted to the PA;
-  requests for disclosure o f certain TPs or (sub)fees;
-  clearance messages stating that all book-keeping (such as pre-im ages/TPs) can be 
dropped up to a certain day.
Confirmation messages typically involve return messages by the PA com prising a time- 
stam ped and digitally signed copy o f the data subm itted to and received by the PA. If such 
a confirmation m essage does not arrive within a certain tim e frame, the OBE m ay notify the 
user. Clearly, OBEs need to be able to check digital signatures o f the PA. This requires that 
they contain a certificate for the public key o f the PA. This public key m ay also be used to 
encrypt m essages to the PA. However, as already has been m entioned in Section 5.2, such 
cryptographic details are outside the scope o f the current paper.
7 Some properties
This section will explicitly discuss some o f the properties o f the proposed approach us­
ing non-revealing commits. One m ain point is that this approach makes privacy-friendly 
(decentralised) and fraud-resistant solutions possible, even when using thin OBE. Another 
m ain point is that existing fat solutions can be im proved substantially by adding the use 
o f non-revealing commits, thus m aking a num ber of advantages of ‘thin’ (e.g. related to 
spot-checking, costs, m onitoring ability and system continuity) also available for ‘fat’. For 
example, fat solutions can be m ade less vulnerable to com prom ise o f the O B E’s physical 
protection (i.e. to tampering). Below we treat several aspects in m ore detail.
7.1 W ide ra n g e  o f rea lisa tio n  op tions
The proposed approach allows m uch implem entation freedom. The only two tasks that cer­
tainly m ust be perform ed in the vehicle are determ ining the relevant traffic data (e.g. trajec­
tory data) and temporarily registering these data piece by piece (e.g. per minute) locally. All 
other work— except the optional ‘internal com m its’ (see Section 6.1)— can be perform ed, 
at desire, inside or outside the vehicle.
Clearly, for doing all w ork (including subfee calculations) inside the vehicle fat OBE 
is required. In case of m inim al w ork inside the vehicle, the (thin) OBE m ust transfer the 
relevant traffic data to equipm ent outside the vehicle taking care o f all other work. This 
latter equipm ent m ay be the user’s own PC or the processing equipm ent o f a party chosen 
by the user. However, thin OBE m ay also do all w ork with only the exception of subfee 
calculations outside the vehicle. The thin OBE then takes care o f com m itting to the traffic 
data, distributing autom atically and anonym ously fee calculations to selected Calculation 
Service Providers, collecting the results, com mitting to these results, reporting the quarterly 
fee to the PA and reacting to m essages from  the PA, such as verification requests. N ote that 
all this processing can be fully autom ated and can be perform ed by OBE, if desired.
In short, users have a w ide range of OBE options to choose from. Their choice m ay de­
pend on additional services offered and on how m uch control they w ish to have themselves. 
That is, on w hether they w ish to trust one or m ore other parties and, if  so, how much.
7.2 ‘T h in ’ a n d  ‘fa t’ can  be in te g ra te d  g racefu lly
The proposed approach makes ETP systems possible in which some vehicles use thin and 
others fat OBE and in which the same spot-checking approach is used for all vehicles.
7.3 S im ple an d  effective spot-checks
Spot-checks in our approach can be based on random  observations, ju st as in case o f ‘con­
ventional thin’ (i.e. the centralised approach from  Section 3). During an observation no 
real-tim e com m unication with the vehicle is required, which greatly reduces the com plex­
ity (and costs) o f spot-checking. Furtherm ore, unnoticed spot-checking is m ade possible, at 
least during daylight. W ithout further explanation we m ention that unnoticed spot-checks 
can be m uch m ore effective than detectable ones and thus can be used to (further) reduce 
the spot-checking costs (or to achieve better fraud resistance at the same costs).
The sim ple and effective observation-based spot-checks can be used to m onitor the 
actual fraud resistance level (see below) and also to replace either all or only part o f spot­
checks based on real-tim e interrogation o f the OBE (e.g. via DSRC). If  one chooses for 
exclusively m aking use o f observation-based spot-checks, one saves the costs for the hard­
ware and software required for the real-tim e com m unication channel and gives up the abil­
ity to stop a vehicle on the spot im m ediately after an unsatisfactory interrogation.
An advantage of the proposed approach is that these simple, effective and cost-efficient 
observation-based spot-checks can also be used for fat OBE.
7.4 S pot-checking  a n d  physical p ro tec tio n  can  w o rk  ‘in  p a ra lle l’
In our approach (as well as in ‘conventional th in’) spot-checks can produce effect even if 
the OBE is not protected at all against m anipulation o f trajectory data. Indeed, m anipulat­
ing the contents o f a trajectory data part (TP) does not m ake m uch sense as long as that TP 
is com m itted (in case o f ‘conventional th in’: transferred to the PA) before the forger could 
find out at which locations and times the probability o f his vehicle having been observed 
is sufficiently low to m ake the risk o f being caught acceptable. Thus, if the PA manages 
to keep the times and locations o f a considerable part o f all random  observations secret 
until the TPs have been com m itted (in case o f ‘conventional thin’: have been transferred), 
then fraudulent TPs m ay be uncovered by spot-checks. In other words, the effectiveness of 
observation-based spot-checks depends on the am ount o f increased knowledge that poten­
tial forgers can tim ely acquire on the likelihood of having been observed, but not on the 
physical protection o f OBE (against trajectory data manipulation).
The property ju st described is very important. It implies that the protection achieved by 
spot-checking (say, the logical protection) and the physical protection can w ork ‘in parallel’ 
and thus provide for two independent layers o f protection. In other words, the total level o f 
fraud resistance is equal to the sum o f the fraud resistance achieved by physical protection 
and o f the fraud resistance achieved by spot-checking. This has the advantage that one can 
get rid of the risks that adhere to full reliance on physical protection measures.
N ote that in the decentralised fat approach from  Section 3 the logical and physical 
protection are ‘serial’, since the (effectiveness of) spot-checking by real-tim e interrogation 
o f the OBE depends on the physical protection o f the OBE.
The ‘parallelism ’ property o f the proposed approach (and o f ‘conventional thin’) leads 
to im portant advantages. In the following we will treat three such advantages (related to 
costs, system continuity and monitoring ability). N ote that the proposed approach makes 
these advantages now also available for fat OBE.
C ost o p tim al b a lan ce  betw een  spot-checks a n d  physical p ro tec tio n  In general, a really 
high level o f physical protection is expensive and in the long run (often) not sufficient to 
prevent successful manipulation. One problem  is that perfect physical protection does not 
exist. A nother problem  is that alm ost perfect physical protection— fully in accordance with 
the law o f dim inishing returns— probably results in high or even prohibitive costs. In our 
context a third problem  is that— as far as we know— no physical protection m easure can 
prevent one from  sending false signals to the GNSS receiver in a vehicle and/or altogether 
blocking the true signals originating from  the navigation satellites.
If  spot-checking and physical protection o f OBE w ork in parallel, then the desired level 
o f fraud resistance can be achieved by a com bination o f both. This offers as advantage that 
one can head for a cost optim al balance between spot-checking and physical protection 
measures. If the m arginal costs for additional physical protection m easures (required for 
achieving the last few percent o f the required level o f fraud resistance) are higher than 
the m arginal costs for the additional spot-checking (required for achieving that same last 
few percent), then one can choose for increasing the intensity o f spot-checking and for not 
applying additional physical protection m easures. A nd if not, then one can increase the 
physical protection instead o f increasing the spot-checking intensity.
The proposed approach makes this balancing now also possible for ‘fat’.
System  con tinu ity  is less v u ln e rab le  Some level o f (hardware and software) protection 
will be used in OBE implementations. For instance, to m ake m anipulation o f trajectory data 
sufficiently difficult. But when that protection gets broken at some stage in the future, this 
event does not underm ine the essence of the system and disrupt it fundamentally, a t a  large 
scale. A fter all, one can tem porarily increase the intensity o f spot-checking to keep the level 
o f fraud resistance (roughly) intact. As soon as the problem s with the physical protection 
have been solved (which m ay take quite some time), one can decrease the intensity of 
spot-checking to an appropriate level.
In short, the system continuity is less vulnerable, since there is less (vulnerable) depen­
dence on physical protection m easures. This now also works for ‘fat’.
A bility  to  m o n ito r  th e  ac tu a l f ra u d  resis tance  level Since the observation-based spot- 
checking that we have described, works independent o f the O B E’s physical protection, it 
can be used to m onitor the fraud resistance level actually achieved, that is, the real percent­
age o f violators.
Suppose that the PA allows m ultiple traffic pricing Service Providers (SPs) that each 
m ake use of a  different type o f equipment. Suppose also that each SP guarantees to the PA 
a certain level o f fraud resistance (e.g. by physical protection only, or e.g. by a com bination 
o f physical protection for the OBE and o f interrogation-based spot-checking by or on behalf 
o f the SP). Then the PA can use the observation-based spot-checking to m onitor in the field 
whether the SPs really succeed in keeping fraud below the level agreed upon.
The proposed approach makes such m onitoring now also possible for ‘fat’.
7.5 P rivacy  a n d  d a ta  p ro tec tion
Sending m essages need not be done continually while driving and can be lim ited to, say, 
once a day. Thus, one can allow users to influence the mom ents and places o f transm is­
sion. This is beneficial for privacy protection, because, for instance, a GSM  provider m ight 
determ ine the vehicle’s location at the tim e of transmission.
Furtherm ore, privacy-sensitive travel and fee data can be stored decentralised, under 
control o f participants, instead o f in some m assive central database o f the PA, where they 
m ight be m isused in various ways, for instance as result o f function creep.
A part from  the total fee due and from  the location and fee data involved in spot-checks, 
no privacy-sensitive data needs to be revealed to the PA or a TTP. This am ount o f data 
seems to be optim al (for privacy). N ote that spot-checks are always necessary, at least if 
one does not wish to fully rely on physical protection measures.
Assuming that a certain fixed level o f fraud resistance m ust be achieved, one can re­
duce the spot-checking— and thus increase the privacy protection— in proportion as one 
increases the physical protection applied to the OBE.
A ll this is true both for the decentralised fat approach from  Section 3 and for our ap­
proach, even when the latter makes use o f thin OBE. As a consequence, our ‘thin’ (which is 
decentralised) offers im portant advantages over ‘conventional thin’ (i.e. centralised ‘th in’).
In order to prevent the PA from spot-checking individual vehicles too much, a limit 
(i.e. maximum) can be set to the number of spot-checks allowed per vehicle per period. 
Furthermore, the PA can also be kept from asking detailed whereabouts (i.e. TPs) of partic­
ular vehicles without having a corresponding observation, by obligating the PA to specify 
in requests for TPs both the time of observation and the location of the observed vehicle. 
Based on the time and location specified, it is easy (e.g. for the OBE) to automatically 
detect possible abuse attempts by the PA.
7.6 Com m unication and  critical tim e paths
In case of ‘conventional thin’, the OBE commits to traffic data parts by transferring them 
to the PA. As suggested in Section 7.4, this transferring preferably3 should be performed 
before users can find out at which locations and times the probability of their vehicle having 
been observed is sufficiently low to make the risk of being caught acceptable. Similarly, in 
our approach the committing to trajectory parts is (to a certain extent) ‘time critical’.
If a request for details (i.e. for a TP) is only allowed if the PA has observed the vehicle 
at the corresponding time and location (see Section 7.5), then calculating the fee due for a 
traffic data part and committing to the result has also ‘time critical’ aspects4.
All communication and other work afterward is not ‘time critical’. Indeed, the com­
munication required for spot-checking is not sensitive for, say, a substantial break down 
of the communication system, such as a breakdown of several days. Note that much or 
most of the communication can be done at specific moments or places, when a cheap con­
nection (e.g. WiFi) is available, for instance at home or at a fueling station offering such 
connectivity. All this may be used to reduce the communication costs. We do not wish to 
discussion the communication costs of different approaches further, because these costs are 
rather unclear at this stage. For example, they depend much on the type of communication 
channel(s) used. Furthermore, this issue is not crucial for the purpose of our presentation.
7.7 Individual responsibility
With our approach it is possible (but not necessary) to give users individual autonomy by 
allowing them to take maximal responsibility. This is to a certain extent comparable to the 
current responsibility of individual citizens for the submittal and correctness of the contents 
of tax forms for income and revenue. Indeed, there are some developments that tax author­
ities support citizens by providing partly pre-filled forms, but in the end the responsibility 
still lies with the citizen. The role of the state is to (statistically/randomly) check these tax 
reports, to collect the associated fees and to punish those individuals (or organisations) that 
do not fulfil their duties.
A system in which the state takes the full responsibility— that is, determines all by itself 
(without user involvement) the amount of taxes due—is completely different. Citizens then 
are turned into passive subjects whose behaviour is being monitored almost constantly 
in order to obtain the relevant data for calculating fees. Such a system may seem more 
convenient for users, but is definitely also more threatening than the traditional declaration- 
based one. It constitutes a fundamental change in the balance of power and responsibilities.
In the end it is of course a political decision in which direction our societies are moving. 
Our approach at least provides a technical basis to uphold individual autonomy a bit longer.
3 Otherwise, the logical protection (i.e. the additional independent layer of protection) will be weak 
and one must rely (almost) fully on the OBE’s physical protection, which we do not advocate.
4 If ample time is available, one might succeed in acquiring almost complete knowledge on where 
and when observation teams have been active and then committing to a zero fee for all TPs where 
the risk of having been observed is negligible. Note that: a) the PA may provide for a sufficient 
number of unnoticed observations as countermeasure, b) external commits may be seen as less 
‘time critical’ if internal commits (see Section 6.1) are used, and c) internal commits rely on phys­
ical protection (just as fat OBE does).
8 Use scenarios: granny, gadget & geek
This section will elaborate, to some extent, three different use scenarios of the proposed 
ETP approach, which we shall (respectfully) label ‘granny’, ‘gadget’ and ‘geek’.
‘Granny’ is well-aware of painful periods in history and is not happy with the idea that 
others (in particular, the state) know her car movements, but she definitely does not want 
much ado. She uses computers, in a limited way, but does not (wish to) understand the in­
ternal workings. She simply buys a black box that handles everything for her. Our ‘granny’ 
chooses for thin OBE that computes and sends the trajectory hashes itself, distributes fee 
calculations to selected Calculation Service Providers, sends hashes of the results (see Sec­
tion 6.3) to the PA and also automatically handles the verification requests from the PA. 
After each quarter the device informs her via a display (or an SMS or e-mail) how much 
she has to pay for that quarter. On her request, the device will show her other aggregations 
of fee calculations. For example, the fee due for a particular trip, day or week.
The ‘gadget’ person does not care very much about his privacy. He is willing to ex­
change it for extra services. He chooses some organisation that he trusts and that sells fancy 
car navigation systems (including for instance a car assistance or breakdown service) with 
embedded traffic pricing functionality. He buys such a device and signs a service contract 
so that the company will take care of all road fee submissions and checks on his behalf. 
The device sends his location information (trajectory parts) to the company, which handles 
the hash and fee submissions and the answers to spot-checks. The company to which he 
has delegated his road pricing duties thus knows his whereabouts, but offers additional ser­
vices in return, like safety surveillance and tailored real-time congestion information with 
personalised suggestions for alternative routes.
Our ‘geek’ does not trust anyone. She wants a minimal system in her car that only stores 
trajectory parts and communicates their daily hashes to the PA. She frequently transfers her 
trajectory parts (pre-images) to her PC, e.g. via WiFi or perhaps even via a dump on a USB 
memory stick or on her Bluetooth cell-phone. She uses open source software to do all the 
work required. Her software calculates the (sub)fees on the basis of publicly available map 
information, sends their hashes (see Section 6.3) as well as the fee due for each quarter to 
the PA via the web, and handles all spot-checking requests from the PA. With every spot­
check request concerning a trajectory part, the software on her PC first checks whether the 
time and location as specified by the PA are correct (see Section 7.5). If not, she asks for 
the photograph to find out whether this may have been an understandable error of the PA 
or an abuse attempt. She uses the additional functionality of her software package to keep 
a personal record of all her travels and can visualise them in Google maps (via Tor). She 
also keeps them to show to her boss, if needed, to substantiate her occasional reclaims for 
business trips. Note that a reasonable possibility is that the open source software package 
and the required map information are produced and published on behalf of the PA, say via 
a web site.
All these three fictitious individuals fulfil, in quite different ways, the duties associated 
with a system for ETP as proposed here. It shows that there is ample room for individual 
variation and for contributions and additional services by commercial organisations.
9 Final remarks
The main idea in this paper is simple and general. It may be described as follows. Con­
sumers use certain ‘goods’. Examples are use of transport infrastructure (such as a whole 
road network as described in previous sections, or toll roads, or parking lots, or a public 
transportation system) or consumption of, say, electricity. Each consumer’s usage is mea­
sured by equipment in the consumer’s environment, which is ‘potentially hostile’ for the 
goods provider. Correct functioning of and reporting by the equipment may be the respon­
sibility of the consumer, of a party chosen by the consumer (e.g. an independent equipment
provider), of the goods provider (e.g. in certain cases that it also provides for the equipment 
or parts thereof) or of any combination of these. Our approach is useful and suitable for all 
these cases of individual or shared responsibility. For the following, let us assume the user 
is (mainly) responsible. Then the consumer (or actually equipment on his behalf) commits 
himself to the measurements by transferring hashes (fingerprints) of the measured values to 
the goods provider (or a pricing authority), while keeping secret the measured values. The 
measured values (i.e. the pre-images of the hashes) are used for the calculation of fees due 
(for short periods). These calculations can be done separately and in a privacy-friendly way 
and hashes of their results must also be transferred to the goods provider. Only the total fee 
due for a longer period (i.e. the sum of the fees due for many short periods) is reported to 
the goods provider in ‘readable’ form. The goods provider can guarantee fraud resistance 
by spot-checking in a way similar to what has been described in previous sections.
Underlying such an architecture is a certain view on the organisation of our society in 
which individuals remain responsible for what they do and their behaviour is not constantly 
monitored and checked. To make this view more concrete, consider a toll gate, for instance 
at the entrance of a bridge or of a congestion fee area. The traditional way to organise such 
a fee is to identify (for instance via license plate recognition or via some DSRC-tag) each 
vehicle passing by and to charge a fee on the basis of such observations. This is in a sense 
the most obvious solution. It is rather privacy-unfriendly however, because all passages of 
individual vehicles are— at least temporarily—registered in some database (of the authority 
in question) that is open to various forms of secondary use. A different solution, in line 
with the approach presented in this paper, is the following. The gate constantly broadcasts 
messages of the form “you are passing this-and-this gate at this-and-this time and this-and- 
this tariff table must be applied”, which are recorded by the OBE of vehicles that pass by. 
The OBE of these vehicles regularly transfer hashes of these records to a central authority 
and also hashes of the fees due for such passages. Vehicles may be photographed now and 
then in order to randomly check the correctness of the total fee reported for a longer period. 
Thus, only a small subset of all passages is recorded (temporarily) by the authority.
Which approach do you prefer? In the end this is a societal issue. This paper provides 
a technical framework for more privacy-friendly (but also more fraud-resistant) solutions 
than are currently being employed.
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